Attorney Matthews Bark of Orlando – Illinois Issues a Special License Plate For Legal Window Tint

Source     : Jalopnik
By             : Doug DeMuro
Category : Attorney Matthews Bark of Orlando, Matthews Bark Criminal Defense

Illinois Issues a Special License Plate For Legal Window Tint
Illinois Issues a Special License Plate For Legal Window Tint

I’m walking down the street the other day somewhere in California, and I stumble across an Audi A4 with an Illinois license plate that has black writing on it. Now, I can’t be sure of much in this fast-changing planet we call home, but I can be sure of this: Illinois license plates have red writing, typically stamped directly on top of Abraham Lincoln’s nose. The license plate also has an unusual format that ends with the letters “WT.” What does WT stand for? Work Truck? Wiggle Taxonomy? Waving Tutu? Wild Turkey? This situation irked me enough that I decided to take a picture of it. Then I did what any normal, rational person would do when they see something that makes them curious: I forgot about it for like six months. So last month I’m going through my pictures, and I notice the Wiggle Taxonomy license plate among them. And at that moment, I committed to solving the mystery once and for all by doing what any serious, professional, highly qualified journalist would do: I began poring over Illinois state statutes, stopping only for lunch, dinner, and the occasional break for rocking out to Jimmy Eat World songs with my stuffed capybara.

No, I’m just kidding. What I actually did was, I Googled it. I do have a stuffed capybara, though. Here’s what I learned: that mysterious “WT” code on the license plate I saw? It does not stand for Wild Turkey, or Whirling Taliban, or Walking Turtles. It stands for Window Tint. This is a special license plate for window tint.
What exactly is a special license plate for window tint? I will let the Illinois state statute do the talking, as it very clearly states in Section 12, Row 6, Seats 3 and 4, on the third base side:

A person owning and operating a motor vehicle, who is determined by a physician licensed to practice medicine and is afflicted with or suffers from medical disease such as systemic or discoid lupus erythematosus, disseminated superficial actinic porokeratosis or albinism, which would require that person to be shielded from the direct rays of the sun is entitled to operate said vehicle with tinted windows. This exception also applies to a vehicle used in transporting a person when the person resides at the same address as the registered owner and the person is afflicted with or suffering from a qualifying medical condition”. However, no exemption from the requirements of subsection (a-5) shall be granted for any condition, such as light sensitivity, for which protection from the direct rays of the sun can be adequately obtained by the use of sunglasses or other eye protective devices.

For those of you who do not wish to spend your time on Jalopnik reading statutes from a place where the local prison population primarily consists of former governors, allow me to paraphrase: the window tint license plate is issued to people who have a medical condition that requires them to be shielded from the direct rays of the sun. However, the statute very clearly says that the plate is not for people who have simple “light sensitivity,” which can be solved with “the use of sunglasses or other eye protective devices.” I imagine this is much in the same way that a disabled license plate is not for people who have minor disabilities, such as too much back hair, or bad breath, or they’re 28 years old and they have a capybara stuffed animal. And indeed, the Audi I saw with the Window Tint license plates had extremely tinted windows; windows so tinted that they may have actually been painted metal. This would not surprise me, as I suspect Audi charges more for “transparent windows,” as part of the same $2,400 Convenience Package that includes round tires.

Now, for those of you reading this from outside North America, you might be wondering why any of this exists: window tint laws. Exceptions to window tint laws. License plates with Abraham Lincoln’s face on them. Well, the answer is that window tint is a very divisive issue here in this part of the world. This is because police officers believe heavily tinted windows to be a huge safety hazard, in the sense that they greatly diminish visibility, and also tinted windows make it hard for an officer to see how many people are in a vehicle, or whether not they’re reaching for a weapon during a traffic stop. On the flip side of the argument, a large contingent of 19-year-olds support tinted windows because “they look cool.” Personally, I’m not a big fan of window tint on my own vehicles, because it reduces my visibility at night. I am, however, for Illinois’ special license plate, because I believe it’s an interesting way to accommodate a disability. In fact, I think the program should expand. For example: I would qualify for an “RC” license plate, which of course would alert officers to the fact that the driver might be Rocking out to Jimmy Eat World with a stuffed Capybara.

Read More : Jalopnik.com/illinois-issues-a-special-license-plate-for-legal-windo-1771775231

Matthews Bark Criminal Defense – Why Are Legal States Setting More Limits on Cannabis?

Source     :  Leafly
By             :  Ben Aldin
Category : Attorney Matthews Bark of Orlando, Matthews Bark Criminal Defense

Why Are Legal States Setting More Limits on Cannabis?
Why Are Legal States Setting More Limits on Cannabis?

In Oregon, authorities are planning to implement a new rule that would cap individual serving sizes of infused edibles at 5 mg THC, or half that of Washington and Colorado. Currently there are no potency limits for Oregon edibles, though they’re only available to state-registered medical patients. The measure is scheduled to go into effect on Oct. 1. Regulators explain the change not as an attack on the industry but as a push to curb the horror stories of young children coming into emergency rooms after mistakenly ingesting edibles. The new limits, they say, are actually aimed at helping the new market succeed. “Everybody’s aware that all eyes are on us,” said André Ourso, manager of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Program. As the statewide experiment unfolds, it’s no secret U.S. and international governments are watching keenly. “It’s a frontier,” Ourso said. “It really is something new, and I think everybody wants to do it right and not make mistakes going forward.” Oregon’s new rule would limit retail edibles to 5 mg THC per serving for things like cookies and chocolates. An entire package could contain no more than 50 mg. Medical products would have higher limits, up to 100 mg per package.  While Colorado and Washington have had years of regulatory opportunities, “this is pretty much our first real regulatory crack at rulemaking,” Ourso explained. “Setting lower limits, it allows us to look at things in a more cautious public health manner.” He stressed that the lower limits don’t mean Oregon regulators are opposed to cannabis. “We don’t want to decimate an entire industry; that’s not our goal,” he said. “We want to have a well-regulated industry, just like any other.” The proposal is winning hesitant buy-in from some producers and dispensary operators. While business owners aren’t necessarily in favor of the proposed rules, they said, they understand the unique position legal cannabis still occupies.  “I think obviously they’re coming from a public safety standpoint, and we get it,” said Oregon cannabis entrepreneur Brent Kenyon, founder of Southern Oregon Alternative Medicine dispensaries and maker of the 400-mg-THC Chocowanna Bar, which would be prohibited under the new state rule.  A big piece of the industry’s buy-in seems to come from the sense that authorities in Oregon are genuinely on board with cannabis. When there’s a rub, Kenyon said, he’s seen the Oregon Liquor Control Commission, which also regulates cannabis, revise rules in response to feedback from both the industry and the public. “They’ve done a great job of reaching out to everyone,” Kenyon said. “The state of Oregon doesn’t want to squish commerce.”  If trust can go a long way in getting stakeholders on the same page, though, a misunderstanding can make for disaster. In Colorado, a recent legislative push to limit the potency of all cannabis products drew the ire of many in the industry. Michael Elliot, executive director of the Denver-ased Marijuana Industry Group, described the measure in a Denver Post op-ed as “an attempt to make pot illegal.”  The proposal would’ve capped THC in all cannabis and cannabis products — including concentrates — at 15 percent. That’s lower than the current state average of 17.1 percent THC for raw flower, and it’s drastically below the average concentrate potency of 62.1 percent. The Colorado lawmaker who introduced the legislation, Rep. Kathleen Conti (R-Littleton), said in an interview that the proposal came in response to a lack of scientific research into the safety of high-THC cannabis. She also said it’s her opinion that too many in Colorado have adopted the opinion that “if it’s legal, it can’t hurt you.”
“We don’t know that to be true,” she said.

Critics, however, said the ignorance cut both ways. The manner in which the bill was written, they argued, suggested Conti and her staff didn’t adequately understand cannabis. “I don’t think a lot of thought was put into the proposals,” Mark Slaugh, executive director of the Cannabis Business Alliance, told the Denver Post as the measure was being considered. “This bill threatens to wipe out most infused product manufacturers, and its language is unclear what to do with edibles.” Growers would have to destroy common strains with higher THC levels, they complained, and even carefully cultivated cannabis could come in above the cap, depending on growing conditions. And ultimately if consumers couldn’t obtain their favorite products legally, critics warned, they’d likely turn to the black market. The 15-percent limit barely fell short in committee, by a 6–5 vote, but lawmakers have promised to return to the issue next year. In the meantime, both sides are gearing up to battle over a bill introduced last week, HB 1436, that would prohibit infused edibles that “resemble the form of a human, animal, or fruit” because they are “shaped in a manner to entice a child.”

Regulation or Education?

There are good reasons to question caps on cannabis potency. But it’s also fair to say that edibles earn cannabis a lot of bad press when people, whether children or just rookie consumers, accidentally eat too much. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd is an infamous example; she ate a whole cannabis-infused candy bar without realizing it contained 16 servings. Even officials who favor cannabis have started to rethink edibles. In Aspen, Colo., Sheriff Joe DiSalvo admits he’s struggling with how to regulate products like cookies and candy, which he worries might appeal to kids. County commissioners have asked DiSalvo to provide a recommendation as to whether Aspen should ban all edibles except for those in pill form, a decision the sheriff said he’s still considering. “It goes back to, for me, what is the real point of a cookie or a gummy when you can get it delivered in a different way?” he said. “I don’t know why you need to have in this other form when you could swallow it and be done with it.”  He acknowledged a lot of the terrible stories he hears are anecdotal. “I wonder about that myself sometimes,” he said. But because he worries horror stories cause harm to the industry, he said a ban on edibles might be the way to go. “Is cookies and candies equivalent to putting a smiley face on a bottle of Jack Daniels and making it appeal to a kid?” he asked. “When it comes to children and use, we’re all concerned about that.”  How does he feel about a cap on overall cannabis potency in Colorado? “I would fight it to the death. I don’t see a lot of accidental ingestion with flower.”

Read more: Leafly.com/news/headlines/why-are-legal-states-setting-more-limits-on-cannabis

Matthews Bark Criminal Defense – Can I use that? A Legal Primer For Journalists

Source     : CJR Org
By            : Jonathan Peters
Category : Attorney Matthews Bark of Orlando, Matthews Bark Criminal Defense

Bail Bonds In Orlando Fl - Can I use that? A Legal Primer For Journalists
Can I use that? A Legal Primer For Journalists

As a media law scholar and practicing media lawyer, I field all manner of questions every week—from students, journalists, editors, and others. Whether I’m speaking generally to a non-client or giving specific legal advice to a client, I’ve noticed that the questions fall into three broad categories:

Can I use that?
Can I say that?
Can I do that?

Within each category, some issues come up more than others. They’re the greatest hits, so to speak, and I’m going to begin sampling that album with you here—starting with the category Can I use that? Future stories will explore the other two categories. Keep in mind that I’m a lawyer, not your lawyer (unless I actually am your lawyer), and these comments shouldn’t be construed as legal advice.

How to obtain a copyright

Can I use that? questions are typically copyright questions. First, freelancers want to know how to obtain a copyright in something they created. This is sort of the inverse of Can I use that? The person wants to know how to control the way others use her work. So, assuming a work is copyrightable in the first place (some things, like facts and short phrases, are not), it’s copyrighted upon creation. Generally, the copyright is owned by whoever created the work. But if it’s created in the course of employment, it’s usually considered a “work for hire” and owned by the employer. The New York Times, for example, owns the copyright in articles written by its employees. Among freelancers, copyright ownership depends on the rights articulated in their contracts. It’s not ​uncommon for freelancers and their publications to share copyrights in some way. Now, even though a work is copyrighted upon creation, it’s prudent for the owner to register the work with the US Copyright Office. Registration puts the world on notice of the copyright, and allows the owner to enforce the right in court. Plus, the federal copyright statute entitles the owner to statutory damages if she registers the work before infringement or within three months of the work’s publication. That’s helpful because it means the owner doesn’t have to prove actual losses in an enforcement ​suit. And, although this isn’t required to obtain a copyright, I usually advise my clients—especially the photojournalists—to place a copyright notice on each of their works. To be most effective, it should include the owner’s name, the year the work was created, and the copyright symbol. Why do I give that advice? If the client needs to enforce her copyright in court, notice takes away the defendant’s ability to claim that he innocently infringed, a defense that can ​mitigate the owner’s damages.

Fair use

Lots of people ask me about fair use, the doctrine that allows you to use a copyrighted work without permission. First, understand that the goal of copyright law is not only to protect the rights of people who create content but also “to promote the progress of science and useful arts,” according to the Constitution. Allowing creators to enforce their copyrights in all cases would frustrate the latter, so the courts and Congress adopted the fair use doctrine to allow uses of copyrighted works that would benefit society. I spend my time in this area disabusing people of misconceptions—that you can sample up to 10 seconds of an audio recording, or copy up to three paragraphs of a book, or use whatever you want as long as it’s newsworthy or included in a news report. In reality, there are no such bright-line rules. To determine whether a use is fair, a court considers four factors. The first is the purpose and character of the use (chiefly whether it’s for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, or research, all of which favor fair use). The second is the nature of the copyrighted work itself (whether, say, it was unpublished, which is entitled to greater protection). The third is the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the work as a whole (the more of the original work used, the more likely it’s an infringement). And the fourth is the effect of the use on the market for, or value of, the copyrighted work (uses that supplant the original work in the marketplace are unlikely to be fair). No single factor is determinative, and notably the fact that something is newsworthy, or used in a news report, does not automatically make its use fair. That’s probably where I spend the most time educating people. Using a ​copyrighted ​work for a news report will be considered as part of factor one, but that does not end the analysis—the court will go on to consider the other factors, and if they don’t favor fair use, then your use won’t be protected.

Linking and embedding

The last major Can I use that? issue is linking. As we surf the Web, we rely greatly on links to navigate from page to page—to look up related content. And news organizations increasingly are using links to provide access to their source material. But what if you post something that links to copyrighted or infringing content? Are you liable under prevailing copyright rules? Different types of linking present different copyright issues, and the law is not entirely settled here—so I’ll hit the two most important points that (for the most part) are settled. First, “deep linking” is what most of us think of when we think of linking. It means placing a link on your site that leads to a page on another site. Doing that, generally, does not constitute copyright infringement—even if the other site is hosting copyrighted or infringing content​. Second, “inline linking” is what most of us call embedding. It means placing a line of HTML code in your site so it displays content directly from another site (e.g., embedding a tweet in a news story). That does not, generally, infringe any​ copyright because no copy of the embedded content has been made—the inline link is simply a piece of code that represents the content as it exists on the originating site. Moreover, most third-party platforms, like Twitter, include in their terms of service a provision that says the user permits others to embed his or her content. Which raises a related issue: Embedding copyrighted content may be okay, but screenshotting it and posting the screenshot is not. That’s basically the electronic equivalent of making a copy of the work, putting it squarely in the crosshairs of copyright law. So, if you find content on social media and want to use it (e.g., in an online news story), embedding is the safest way to do it—not screenshotting.

Read More : cjr.org/united_states_project/journalist_legal_questions.php

Matthews Bark Criminal Defense – Will Artificial Intelligence Favor Conservative Legal Theorists?

Source      : Bell Street News
By             : Gabe Friedman
Category  : Attorney Matthews Bark of Orlando, Matthews Bark Criminal Defense

Will Artificial Intelligence Favor Conservative Legal Theorists?
Will Artificial Intelligence Favor Conservative Legal Theorists?

If computers replace human lawyers anytime soon, it is more likely to benefit politically conservative legal philosophies, such as the one embraced by Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, than liberal philosophies – purely due to idiosyncrasies in the way the dominant technology works, a new paper argues. That’s one of the ideas put forward in a draft version of “Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services,” written by Brian Sheppard, an associate professor at Seton Hall University School of Law. “My argument is that if lawyers are going to be replaced by computers … some of the more conservative [legal] theories may become more popular again because computers can do them quite well,” he said in an interview with Big Law Business. By legal philosophies or theories, Sheppard said he meant the different principles of adjudication that lawyers use when interpreting the law and the Constitution. His paper doesn’t identify any one philosophy with a political leaning, but Sheppard told Big Law Business that generally speaking, some conservative theories will likely be easier for computers to emulate because they are more black-and-white, with little subjectivity.

One of the best-known philosophies, Originalism, holds that the meaning of the U.S. Constitution was fixed at the time of its enactment, and is now closely identified with Scalia, Sheppard said. While it’s often viewed as conservative, it could also be viewed as a liberal bent under certain circumstances, he added. “There’s no philosophical reason why these theories are conservative,” Sheppard said, about Originalism, adding, “Liberals would love Originalism if the country had been on a steady conservative slide since the day it was founded.” The bulk of the paper is devoted to Sheppard’s theory that bespoke legal services — such as negotiation, the creation of high-stakes legal documents and advocacy — will be more scarce in the future as a result of what he calls “premature disruption,” caused by technological innovation, business model innovation or both. In explaining that theory, Sheppard devotes a chunk of his paper to “natural language processing,” the technology used in various artificial intelligence tools including Google, Apple’s Siri, and IBM’s Watson, and which he believes will play a critical role in any disruption that occurs.

Loosely defined, natural language processing is the interaction between computers and human language, such as a computer’s ability to conduct textual analysis or understand speech. A particular branch of this technology, called the syntactical approach, has progressed the furthest, according to Sheppard. Used in Siri and other products, the syntactical technique “is agnostic as to meaning; it essentially searches for matching sequences of characters and sorts based on distance between matching sequences within documents or based on match frequency,” the paper explains. Thus, it struggles with “elementary interpretative tasks,” but it can parse texts and extract meaning. He situates various legal philosophies along a curve based on how easily they can be emulated using syntactical natural language processing. At the bottom of the curve, the legal philosophy that could be most easily emulated with existing technology is Naïve Textualism, or the idea that statutes can be understood by looking up their words in a dictionary.

Further along the curve, already partially available for automation, Sheppard placed the legal philosophy known as Originalism, most famously embraced by Scalia, which holds that the U.S. Constitution’s meaning was fixed at the time it was enacted. To the extent that Originalism envisions the law as having a fixed meaning in the past, Originalism can be more easily automated, the paper states. But Originalism also calls for an understanding of “the intent” of the people who wrote the Constitution, and thus requires a computer to understand complex contextual dimensions, such as the “perceived problems, goals, hopes or ideals” of original legislators, which makes it difficult to fully automate with the current technology. Living Constitutionalism, which involves evaluating principles according to their practicality, how well they promote democratic legitimacy and the evolving values of the present time, sits at the highest spot on the curve and is the least computer-friendly, the paper states. Eventually, natural language processing could emulate such philosophies, with more gray areas, but that technology is still years, if not decades away from being deployable, according to Sheppard.

Read more:  bol.bna.com/will-artificial-intelligence-favor-conservative-legal-theorists/

Seminole County DUI Attorney – What Makes Indiana’s Religious-Freedom Law Different?

Source     :  The Atlantic
By             : Garrett Epps
Category :  Seminole County DUI Attorney, Matthews Bark Criminal Defense

In Indianapolis, a crowd protests the new law. (Nathan ChuteReuters )
In Indianapolis, a crowd protests the new law. (Nathan ChuteReuters )

No one, I think, would ever have denied that Maurice Bessinger was a man of faith. And he wasn’t particularly a “still, small voice” man either; he wanted everybody in earshot to know that slavery had been God’s will, that desegregation was Satan’s work, and the federal government was the Antichrist. God wanted only whites to eat at Bessinger’s six Piggie Park barbecue joints; so His servant Maurice took that fight all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which in 1968 decided that his religious freedom argument was “patently frivolous.” Until the day he died, however, Bessinger insisted that he and God were right.  His last fight was to preserve the Confederate flag as a symbol of South Carolina. “I want to be known as a hard-working, Christian man that loves God and wants to further (God’s) work throughout the world as I have been doing throughout the last 25 years,” he told his hometown newspaper in 2000. Growing up in the pre-civil-rights South, I knew a lot of folks like Maurice Bessinger. I didn’t like them much, but I didn’t doubt their sincerity. Why wouldn’t they believe racism was God’s will? We white Southerners heard that message on weekends from the pulpit, on school days from our segregated schools, and every day from our governments. When Richard and Mildred Loving left Virginia to be married, a state trial judge convicted them of violating the Racial Integrity Act. That judge wrote that “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents … The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”

That’s a good background against which to measure the uproar about the Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was signed into law by Governor Mike Pence last week. I don’t question the religious sincerity of anyone involved in drafting and passing this law. But sincere and faithful people, when they feel the imprimatur of both the law and the Lord, can do very ugly things. There’s a factual dispute about the new Indiana law. It is called a “Religious Freedom Restoration Act,” like the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed in 1993.* Thus a number of its defenders have claimed it is really the same law. Here, for example, is the Weekly Standard’s John McCormack: “Is there any difference between Indiana’s law and the federal law? Nothing significant.” I am not sure what McCormack was thinking; but even my old employer, The Washington Post, seems to believe that if a law has a similar title as another law, they must be identical. “Indiana is actually soon to be just one of 20 states with a version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA,” the Post’s Hunter Schwarz wrote, linking to this map created by the National Conference of State Legislatures. The problem with this statement is that, well, it’s false. That becomes clear when you read and compare those tedious state statutes.  If you do that, you will find that the Indiana statute has two features the federal RFRA—and most state RFRAs—do not. First, the Indiana law explicitly allows any for-profit business to assert a right to “the free exercise of religion.” The federal RFRA doesn’t contain such language, and neither does any of the state RFRAs except South Carolina’s; in fact, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, explicitly exclude for-profit businesses from the protection of their RFRAs.

The new Indiana statute also contains this odd language: “A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding, regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding.” (My italics.) Neither the federal RFRA, nor 18 of the 19 state statutes cited by the Post, says anything like this; only the Texas RFRA, passed in 1999, contains similar language. What these words mean is, first, that the Indiana statute explicitly recognizes that a for-profit corporation has “free exercise” rights matching those of individuals or churches. A lot of legal thinkers thought that idea was outlandish until last year’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, in which the Court’s five conservatives interpreted the federal RFRA to give some corporate employers a religious veto over their employees’ statutory right to contraceptive coverage. Second, the Indiana statute explicitly makes a business’s “free exercise” right a defense against a private lawsuit by another person, rather than simply against actions brought by government. Why does this matter? Well, there’s a lot of evidence that the new wave of “religious freedom” legislation was impelled, at least in part, by a panic over a New Mexico state-court decision, Elane Photography v. Willock. In that case, a same-sex couple sued a professional photography studio that refused to photograph the couple’s wedding. New Mexico law bars discrimination in “public accommodations” on the basis of sexual orientation. The studio said that New Mexico’s RFRA nonetheless barred the suit; but the state’s Supreme Court held that the RFRA did not apply “because the government is not a party.” Remarkably enough, soon after, language found its way into the Indiana statute to make sure that no Indiana court could ever make a similar decision.  Democrats also offered the Republican legislative majority a chance to amend the new act to say that it did not permit businesses to discriminate; they voted that amendment down. So, let’s review the evidence: by the Weekly Standard’s definition, there’s “nothing significant” about this law that differs from the federal one, and other state ones—except that it has been carefully written to make clear that 1) businesses can use it against 2) civil-rights suits brought by individuals. Of all the state “religious freedom” laws I have read, this new statute hints most strongly that it is there to be used as a means of excluding gays and same-sex couples from accessing employment, housing, and public accommodations on the same terms as other people. True, there is no actual language that says, All businesses wishing to discriminate in employment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation, please check this “religious objection” box. But, as Henry David Thoreau once wrote, “Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk.”   So—is the fuss over the Indiana law overblown?  The statute shows every sign of having been carefully designed to put new obstacles in the path of equality; and it has been publicly sold with deceptive claims that it is “nothing new.”   Being required to serve those we dislike is a painful price to pay for the privilege of running a business; but the pain exclusion inflicts on its victims, and on society, are far worse than the discomfort the faithful may suffer at having to open their businesses to all. As the story of Maurice Bessinger shows us, even dressed in liturgical garments, hateful discrimination is still a pig.

Link :  theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas-religious-freedom-law-different/388997/

Matthews R Bark – Appeals court rejects legal case against deportation deferral program

Source   : AJC Com
By           : Jeremy Redmon
Category : Matthews Bark Criminal Defense, Matthews R Bark

Appeals court rejects legal case against deportation deferral program
Appeals court rejects legal case against deportation deferral program

A federal appeals court has rejected Mississippi’s attempt to scrap a controversial Obama administration program shielding young immigrants without legal status from deportation. The ruling is significant because it came from the New Orleans-based 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the same court that will hear arguments this month over whether the sweeping executive actions on immigration President Barack Obama announced last year will stand. In a 17-page order issued Tuesday, the appeals court upheld a decision from a lower court against Mississippi and a group of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and deportation officers. The appeals court said the plaintiffs had not “demonstrated the concrete and particularized injury required to give them standing to maintain this suit.”

At issued is the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, or DACA. The program applies to young immigrants who were illegally brought to the U.S. as children, who attend school here and who do not have felony convictions. Those accepted into the program are granted temporary reprieves from deportation and permits to work legally in the U.S. As of December, 19,883 people living in Georgia have been accepted into the program. Mississippi officials have argued DACA has caused additional immigrants without legal status to remain in their state, resulting in additional costs for social services. The ICE agents said federal law requires them to detain and seek to deport all immigrants living illegally in the U.S. They worry that if they enforce the law and ignore DACA they will be subject to employment sanctions.

Link : ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/appeals-court-rejects-legal-case-against-deportati/nkpWr/

Attorney Matthews Bark of Orlando – “A Run Can Keep The Brain Young”

Source      : Calgary Herald
By             : Laura Donnelly – The Telegraph
Category : Attorney Matthews Bark of OrlandoMatthews Bark Criminal Defense

Run Can Keep The Brain Young
 A Run Can Keep The Brain Young

For years, people have assumed that puzzles kept the brain active. But Prof Clive Ballard, professor of age-related disease at King’s College London, said those who wanted the best chance of staving off dementia should opt for a run or a brisk walk. It has long been known that those who take exercise are less likely to develop the condition, but it was only last month that a study at the University of Pittsburgh showed that instead of the brain shrinking – as it does normally at a rate of about 1 per cent a year – it grew by about 2 per cent in those who took a brisk 40-minute walk three times a week. Among those aged between 55 and 80, exercise increased the size of the hippo-campus – the brain’s memory hub – knocking almost two years off its biological age.

Prof Ballard, who was until recently director of research for the Alzheimer’s Society, is leading a study investigating the long-term impact of brain training on older people. The project has already found that puzzles appear to have little short-term impact on the brain. Prof Ballard said some exercises seemed to have some impact in protecting against general cognitive decline, yet had no effect on Alzheimer’s disease. “If people enjoy a crossword that’s great, and it’s possible it does some good. But if people want the best chance of protecting themselves from dementia the answer is to go for a run or a brisk walk, the evidence is clear,” he said. Studies have also suggested social interaction can help to protect against the disease.

SOURCE : calgaryherald.com/news/keep+brain+young/9630803/story.html